Extends the WTO’s earlier condemnation of massive illegal subsidies to Boeing to 26 billion USD in the form of wholly non-refundable corporate welfare. This is the single largest state-level instance of corporate welfare in US history.
The subsidy package condemned by today’s report is large enough to fund the entire development of the 777X and has already cost Airbus $50 billion in sales.
This is only the second time in the WTO’s 20+ year history that a country has been found to have provided prohibited subsidies contingent on domestic content.
Relevant references to the report :
Quotes From the DS487 Panel Report
Para. #
Quote
Purpose Behind Washington State Aerospace Tax Measures
7.63
“The mechanism for achieving the objective of encouraging the aerospace industry [in Washington State] is, in the words of both pieces of [its] legislation, the provision of tax ‘preferences’, ‘exemptions’, and ‘incentives’”.
Financial Contribution & Subsidy Findings
7.157
“Accordingly, the Panel finds that each aerospace tax measure constitutes a financial contribution [to Boeing] within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement because ‘government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected’”.
7.162
“For tax-based financial contributions such as the aerospace tax measures, the relief from taxation otherwise due is not generally available to market participants, nor does it exist as a general condition in the marketplace. ... Indeed, the ‘market conditions’ that are relevant as the benchmark in this context are the competitive conditions that exist in the absence of the challenged financial contribution. Judging the conferral of a benefit by reference to such market conditions, it is clear that the financial contributions of foregone government revenue otherwise due from certain Washington State taxpayers – through a reduced tax rate, credits against business taxation, or exemptions from otherwise applicable tax liability – makes the recipients ‘better off’ than they otherwise would have been, in the marketplace, absent those contributions”. (emphasis added)
7.165
“Having concluded that there is a financial contribution by the Washington State government under each of the aerospace tax measures at issue, and that a benefit is thereby conferred, the Panel finds that each of the aerospace tax measures at issue constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement”.
Prohibited Subsidy Finding
7.363
“[T]he use of imported wings would lead to the loss of the [subsidized] B&O aerospace tax rate. In contrast, if the manufacturer were to use wings made in Washington State by another producer, this would not activate the Second Siting Provision [and therefore would not impact the subsidized tax rate]”.
7.364
“In particular, the only decision by Boeing to source wings which it would then ‘use’ in producing the 777X that would not trigger the Second Siting Provision [and the loss of the subsidy] would be to source such wings within Washington State, which by definition would be domestic wings”. (emphasis original)
7.367
“The loss of the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme if Boeing used 777X wings produced outside of Washington State, even if it maintained production of such wings in Washington State, makes the B&O aerospace tax rate for that programme contingent upon the use of wings made in Washington State”.
7.367
“Accordingly, pursuant to ESSB 5952, and as a result of the Second Siting Provision, the B&O aerospace tax rate subsidy for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme is contingent de facto not only on the production of that aircraft and its wings in Washington State, but additionally on not using 777X wings other than those made in Washington State. Since wings made in Washington State are domestic goods and any imported wings would by definition be made outside of Washington State, it follows that the Second Siting Provision makes the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme contingent upon the use of domestic wings over imported wings”. [MC1]
Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1(a)
“Each of the seven aerospace tax measures at issue in the present case constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement”.
8.1(c)
“With respect to the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision in ESSB 5952, considered jointly, the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme is a subsidy de facto contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement”.
8.5
“The Panel has found that the European Union has demonstrated that the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme, pursuant to ESSB 5952, is a subsidy contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, prohibited under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement”.
8.6
“Accordingly, taking into account the nature of the prohibited subsidy found in this dispute, the Panel recommends that the United States withdraw it without delay and within 90 days”.